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Abstract 
In England and Wales, there are four main categories of offence surrounding images depicting 
child sexual abuse, those of making/taking, publishing, distributing and possession. Despite 
being in force for almost 40 years, it is argued that now, additional regulation is required. In 
response to technological provision such as private browsing, streaming and encryption which 
are providing investigative difficulties for digital forensic analysts, this article proposes the 
need to implement a fifth offence, one of 'intentional accessing' and debates the feasibility and 
justifications for doing so. This proposal coincides with the recent enactment of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which enforces new data retention requirements on Internet 
Service Providers allowing offender Internet connection records to be stored for up to 12 
months and retrospectively investigated.  
Keywords: Images depicting child sexual abuse; Internet; data retention; Investigatory 
Powers Act; crime 
1 Introduction 
Material that constitutes pornography is subject to debate as attitudes surrounding vulgarity 
vary along with ever-changing levels of tolerance and acceptability in societies (O'Donnell and 
Miller, 2007). The major problem initiated by pornography, is that it has not only sexualised 
the abuse of adults but also that of children who are unable to consent to such acts 
(MacKinnon, 1985). In seeking sexual gratification, an individual does not have free rein to 
seek or produce sexualised material of any type, and many jurisdictions have sought to 
legislate on the type of content that is legally acceptable as a form of imagery. Illegal forms of 
sexual imagery in England and Wales can generally be categorised into two main types, 
images depicting child sexual abuse (IDCSA) (it must be noted that this content should not be 
referred to as pornography (see Horsman (2016) for an elaboration of this discussion)) and 
extreme pornography; the former remains the focus of this article.  
Offences of child sexual abuse often trigger significant public outrage, demonstrated by the 
recent investigations into Jimmy Saville (BBC News, 2014) and Iain Watkins (BBC News, 
2013)). Further, IDCSA which stem from physical acts of child abuse are now arguably 
considered by today’s society as one of the worst form of material that an individual can 
engage with due to the harm it causes to both the child depicted and to society as a whole 
(Silbert, 1989). The concerns raised regarding IDCSA in England and Wales have been 
acknowledged for the past 40 years, leading to the implementation of offences under the 
Protection of Children Act 1978. Now, the Internet has enabled new forms of child abuse and 
provides a platform to view child abuse material with relative ease in comparison to before its 
existence, with IDCSA now widespread online and considered more accessible than ever 
before (Akdeniz, 2013; Houtepen, 2014; Seigfried-Spellar, 2014; Seto and Ahmed, 2014).  
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2 The Internet and IDCSA  
Seigfried-Spellar (2014) states that law enforcement are now encountering more cases 
involving IDCSA because of the Internet, with new sites hosting this content continually being 
discovered (Powell et al., 2015). Offences surrounding IDCSA are now widespread providing 
a global regulatory problem (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013). The vast 
majority of prosecutions for IDCSA now involve images that are found on digital storage media 
in computing equipment (Willmore, 2012) where often they are acquired from online sources. 
In the United States (U.S.), Wolak et al., (2014) identified during the course of their study 
244,920 U.S. computers shared 120,418 unique known IDCSA on the Gnutella peer-to-peer 
file sharing network. The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children Annual Report 
(NCMEC, 2014) highlighted that in 2014 it received more than 1.1 million reports to its 
CyberTipline, of which 98% surrounded IDCSA, with the organisation reviewing 28 million 
IDCSA to assist law enforcement investigations and victim identification. Within the United 
Kingdom (UK), since 2009 over 100,000 offences surrounding IDCSA have been recorded 
(CPS, 2015). Children's charity Barnardo’s sexual exploitation services is reported to have 
witnessed a 22% increase in the number of sexually exploited children in 2011-12 of which 
the majority of cases were linked to the use of the Internet (House of Commons, 2013). In the 
UK alone, it is estimated that approximately fifty thousand individuals are involved in the 
acquisition and distribution of IDCSA (CEOP, 2013). The volume of IDCSA in circulation has 
become unmanageable, largely due to the Internet and the regulatory issues it causes. 
Statistics indicate a relatively large number of individuals are being prosecuted for possessing 
or creating IDCSA (Lukas, 2013; CPS, 2015). However, in absence of a definitive figure which 
accurately quantifies both the number of IDCSA in circulation and the actual number of 
individuals involved with them, it is not possible to establish whether these prosecution 
numbers represent all or only a small proportion of those interacting with IDCSA.  
2.1 Increased Accessibility and the Development of a 'Non-Contact Offender' 
As of 2015, the Internet has over 3 billion users world-wide (Statista, 2016) where arguably, 
with increased accessibility comes a potential increase in the number of offenders interacting 
with IDCSA online. Statistics show that in 2015, 86% of households in the UK have Internet 
access, with 78% of UK adults accessing the Internet on a daily basis (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015). When combined with lowering device costs, the majority of UK households 
now own a personal computer or mobile smartphone device which offers potential access to 
sexualised content. The fallout from these technological developments remains that those who 
want to engage with IDCSA no longer need to be involved physically with acts of child abuse 
or with those carrying out these acts, effectively creating a non-contact offender who can 
passively engage with this material online. The Internet offers a seemingly anonymous method 
of fuelling those who can already be termed as a having a fascination with this material (Diez, 
2006).  
Non-contact offenders are often dependent on technology in order access and acquire IDCSA 
and as a result, the Internet has now arguably increased the volume of this type of offender 
by allowing a wider audience access to it. The Internet has transformed an offence from what 
would previously have maintained a physical element of child sexual abuse (when IDCSA are 
being produced), to now one where the only evidence of the offence may exist in cyberspace 
as individuals seek out and view hosted imagery online (Merdian et al., 2013). Despite 
providing substantial benefits to society as well as almost single-handedly revolutionising 
modern day living, the Internet has provided a number of facilities for accessing and acquiring 
IDCSA (Balfe et al., 2015). Through websites, forums and peer-to-peer sharing, the Internet 
offers an accessible and affordable source of IDCSA in comparison to more tangible forms 
such as magazines, photographs or books which prior to the Internet's popularity formed a 
predominant source (Balfe et al., 2015). Jenkins (2003) argues that although the acquisition 
of non-electrical forms of IDCSA is now (and has been for several years) more  difficult than 
digital forms due to the ease that digital data can be created, replicated and transferred across 
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networks. Further, consideration must also now be given to the ‘Deep Web’, a portion of the 
Internet, which cannot be found using traditional search engines. The Deep Web offers access 
to numerous hidden services, which are often cited to have links to IDCSA distribution (Phelps 
and Watt, 2014). Recently, Moore and Rid (2016) identified that the most frequent “use of 
hidden services through Tor are criminal, including drugs, illicit finance and pornography 
involving violence, children and animals”. 
2.2 The Effect of the Internet and Regulatory Attempts  
The Internet poses the unique issue of causing the user to become disinhibited and more likely 
to access material which they would not normally seek out, providing for an “unprecedented 
degree of inquisitiveness, and the danger is that curiosity hardens into deviance” as inhibitions 
are lost (O'Donnell and Miller, 2007). Similarly it offers a false sense of protection and a sense 
of anonymity to the user as they feel that they are not physically identifiable while carrying out 
their online actions (Horsman, 2016b). Taylor and Quayle (2003) highlight that the Internet 
provides the environment for which a curiosity surrounding IDCSA can flourish where 
individuals can seek out material based on their own interests and desires as well as seek 
communication with self-justifying online communities interested in the illegal material (Krone, 
2004).  
Calls have been made for Internet service providers (ISPs) to take more of an active role in 
the policing of IDCSA to stem the availability, and, to have more responsibility for preventing 
access to it (Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2013). The introduction of online mandatory 
filters requiring ‘op-in’s’ from customers in order to access certain categories of material could 
soon be implemented by all of the major ISPs in the UK (Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 
2013). Attempts have also been made in conjunction with Association for Payment Clearing 
Services in the UK to monitor and trace individuals who use their credit card details to 
purchase or access online IDCSA (Davidson et al., 2012). Typically when IDCSA is found on 
a UK based server and reported, its presence will be removed within hours, making it 
inaccessible to other users (Carr and Hilton, 2011). However, such response times are not 
often witnessed when material is hosted abroad leading to the availability of IDCSA being 
prolonged, and in some cases reported websites remained in action over 12 months after 
initial reports were made (Carr and Hilton, 2011). IDCSA may also only be hosted for a limited 
amount of time, long enough to inform offenders so that they can quickly download the content 
before the host site is shut down in order to evade regulating authorities (O'Donnell and Miller, 
2007).  
As well as the ability to report illicit websites, advances in the reliability of website blocking 
technology (seen since 2006) have made a positive impact on restricting access to IDCSA 
(McIntyre, 2010).  As part of the effort made by the Internet Watch Foundation, the search 
engines Google and Microsoft's Bing now block results for 100,000 search terms in 158 
different languages (BBC News, 2014). Yet changing terminology which is used to reference 
IDCSA remains a constant battle. The acknowledgement of a need to block online content 
has also been discussed in the European Parliament. Directive 2011/92/EU on ‘combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA’, article 25 states that member states should take prompt 
action to remove illegally hosted material and may implement blocking techniques to restrict 
access to online content. Despite moves towards regulating IDCSA, it still remains in 
circulation online making it difficult to control and penalise offenders. Section 3 provides an 
analysis of the current legal regulations in force in England and Wales for prosecuting those 
involved with IDCSA. 
3 Existing IDCSA Regulations 
Baroness Strange stated, “although we enjoy liberty, we must not allow the edges of decency 
to be eroded into licentiousness” (House of Lords, 1988). Acts that constitute a crime change 
over time, geographical location and the development of public morals and values (Silverman 
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and Wilson, 2002), with a similar transition visible within England and Wales. It was not until 
the 1970s that involvement with IDCSA was widely regarded as inexcusable and such material 
began to enter the public consciousness as media coverage increased (Jenkins, 2003). 
Involvement with such material is now widely subject to significant stigmatisation, and, viewed 
as indefensible, signifying society’s want for such offences to be punished by law and the need 
for legislation to prohibit IDCSA. 
Individuals associated with these child sex abuse offences are often classified as paedophiles, 
a term which evokes strong opinions. Paedophiles are defined as those who are sexually 
attracted to pre-pubescent children and/or material depicting such individuals and are 
frequently considered “the bogeyman of our age” (Silverman and Wilson, 2002). The word 
itself strikes fear and outrage into many members of society, sparking emotive reactions and 
public frenzy against those who are associated with the term. Child abuse offences have now 
reached such a heighten state of disgrace that even misinformed and propagandised 
information is enough to spark prejudicial public acts (Silverman and Wilson, 2002). Silverman 
and Wilson (2002) attribute the rise of public outrage against paedophilia and child offences 
in the UK to the abduction and murder of Sarah Payne in 2000 (BBC News, 2001) and the 
campaigns by the News of the World which followed in order to ‘name and shame’ convicted 
paedophiles. Similarly the difficulty of identifying, preventing and punishing those who are 
involved with IDCSA, have increased society’s anxiety (Ryder, 2002). Acts of public violence, 
community unrest and vigilantism against potential suspects are regularly witnessed even in 
cases following negligent and erroneous media reports (Jewkes and Andrews, 2007). 
Although developments surrounding the regulation of illegal imagery and sexualised content  
in England and Wales have existed since the late 1950's with the Obscene Publication Acts, 
the main offences surrounding IDCSA can be found in the Protection of Children Act 1978 
(PCA78) and Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA88). These statutes implement the following four 
core offences. Under the PCA78 Section 1(1), it is illegal to take (or permit to be taken) or 
make an IDCSA, to distribute or show an IDCSA and to publish IDCSA. Following the CJA88, 
having possession of IDCSA was also prohibited under Section 160. Although piecemeal 
developments through case law and further legislative enactments have occurred throughout 
the last 28 years, these four fundamental offences have remained persistent. The problem 
caused by this lack of expansion is that technology has developed to offer numerous services 
and provision which allow an individual to operate outside the confines of these current 
restrictions, largely through the Internet.  
3.1 A summary of Problem Areas 
To provide a brief contextualisation of the problems currently posed under the current 
regulations in England and Wales, the following point is initially raised.  
As it stands in England and Wales, an individual can only be prosecuted for IDCSA related 
offences if an IDCSA is actually found during an investigation. At which point it can be 
determined which of the four offences they are subject to. To clarify this point, to be liable for 
possession of IDCSA, an actual image must be found during an investigation and only then 
can possession be determined. Similarly to be liable for making/taking, distributing or 
publishing IDCSA, the IDCSA which was subject to these actions must be identified. Although 
this may seem sensible it must be considered against the volatility of digital data and the ease 
of which it can be destroyed. It is argued that the act of intentionally accessing IDCSA in order 
to view the content is wrong (with arguments for this point supplied in Section 3.1.1); yet 
English law does not acknowledge this. With this point in mind, it should be highlighted that 
there is currently no offence in English law of intentionally accessing IDCSA. It is argued that 
this is an omission in regulations in this area as IDCSA are likely accessed for sexual 
gratification, which is arguably achieved when viewed. There should be no requirement for an 
individual to possess, make, distribute or publish IDCSA before an offence is committed, and 
intentional accessing should be an act also regulated, and is called for by this article.  
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Patrolling the act of intentional accessing is also suggested as a response to technological 
developments, particularly, problem technologies such as in-private browsing sessions, 
streaming facilities and encryption. These techniques can now allow an individual to access 
and view IDCSA online without leaving behind sufficient evidence to prosecute for the current 
offences under the PCA78 and CJA88, and their impact on these offences is discussed in 
Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 of this article. Internet services now provide the ability to view IDCSA 
online but never possess or acquire it on their local device. In essence, a user can now view 
IDCSA online without leaving tangible evidence of a photograph behind on their local device, 
which can be found during an investigation to prosecute an individual.  
Before examining the impact of developments in technology on IDCSA offences, arguments 
for the need to regulate those who intentionally access IDCSA are proposed and examined. 
3.1.1 Proposed Reasoning for an ‘Intentional Accessing’ Offence 
The implementation of an offence of intentionally accessing IDCSA will impact an already 
strained workload of existing law enforcement and associated organizations dealing with 
IDCSA. Therefore, in order to consider the development and implementation of an offence of 
this type, the following justifications for its potential enactment are debated. 
i. As we increase the net, we find more involved in IDCSA 
A substantial issue surrounding IDCSA online is the inability to quantify and therefore 
effectively regulate it. Reports indicate that increasing volumes of IDCSA are being 
discovered, where the Internet Watch Foundation (2016) reported a 417% increase in reports 
of IDCSA from 2013 and 68,092 reports confirming IDCSA URLs, a 118% increase from 2014 
to 2015. There are two potential reasons for increased rates of discovery. First, there may be 
greater engagement with IDCSA online and therefore more is being discovered due to more 
being available. Second, requisite bodies and authorities now have more resources and power 
to look in more detail at the actions occurring online in relation to IDCSA. Hamilton (2011) 
states, as we increase the resources dedicated to identifying involvement in IDCSA we 
discover more cases, and since April 2014, the Internet Watch Foundation has had powers to 
proactively search for IDCSA online as well as reactively respond to reports (Earl, 2016). 
Regardless of which of the above points remains the most accurate (and potentially both to 
varying degrees), ‘a widening of the net’ in terms of how we regulate online IDCSA with a 
move to prohibiting access can allow the appropriate authorities to increase their 
understanding of how IDCSA is created and disseminated online, and, of those who engage 
with it. From a greater understanding, an inference is made that relevant authorities can 
develop more effective regulatory strategies with a potential to identify a greater number of 
child victims and remove them from harm. In turn, prohibiting access may make it possible to 
interrupt the hosting and dissemination of IDCSA online, which may affect the number of 
individuals who subsequently possess or disseminate this material further. In addition, as 
Babchishin et al., (2015, p2) state ‘the ease of access to online child pornography may 
contribute to a new group of offenders who succumb to temptations that they would have 
otherwise controlled’. Prohibiting access to IDCSA and the deterrent of having an offence of 
this type may prevent or stem the development of such an offender group and prevent those 
who harbour a curiosity for IDCSA from becoming involved with it.       
ii. An inference that those who seek it, must then want to abuse children 
A point frequently mooted by research surrounding child sexual abuse offenders is whether 
those who interact with IDCSA online will then carry out physical acts of child sexual abuse. 
Currently, there is no definitive answer (Aslan et al., 2014; Seto et al., 2010), only inferences 
that those who seek sexual gratification from viewing IDCSA must also by process of 
association be interested in acting out such fantasies. Babchishin et al., (2015, p2) highlight 
that the ‘prevalence of sexual interest in children is higher among child pornography offenders 
than among typical, contact sex offenders against children’ drawing reference to their earlier 
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research (Babchishin et al., 2011). In studies by Hanson and Babchishin (2009) and Seto et 
al., (2010) 12.2% of IDCSA offenders were identified as having a history of contact offending 
(Merdian et al., 2016). Further, online offenders ‘were also found to have greater sexual 
deviancy’ (Babchishin et al., 2015). There are many factors to consider which may indicate a 
likelihood of re-offending or cross-over offending from imagery to physical abuse, including 
psychological disorders, life experiences and physiological makeup (Houtepen et al., 2014; 
Babchishin et al 2014; Eke and Seto, 2012). Research has not yet been able to provide a 
clear answer, but concerns have been raised. Regulating access to IDCSA may highlight 
individuals who are on a path to carrying out physical acts of child sexual abuse. In turn, it 
may only highlight those who have intentions to remain non-contact offenders. Failing to 
regulate access to IDCSA remains a risk, one which cannot yet be accurately evaluated and 
in turn has be considered against limited resources and additionally incurred costs by law 
enforcement to control such actions (the feasibility of which is discussed throughout Section 
4).      
iii. Should we not acknowledge technological developments and prohibit it? 
Many countries have taken steps to patrol IDCSA in terms of possession, distribution, creating 
and publishing. In doing so, there is an acknowledgement that these acts are wrong and 
therefore in need of regulation. However, consideration must be given as to the underlying 
motivations for these regulations. At the heart of many arguments is the harm caused to the 
child, both physically and mentally. Possession of IDCSA is prohibited as the image itself 
depicts an illegal act, one which is both harmful to the child depicted but also arguably to 
society as a whole. Given this, the question must be asked, ‘is it too big of a step to take to 
also regulate access to IDCSA?’. Arguably IDCSA is sought by an individual in order to 
achieve some level of sexual gratification from it, and this is likely achieved when viewed. 
Take for instance, the situation of two individuals, one who views IDCSA online (but the image 
is never stored on their local device – see discussion of private browsing and streaming in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3), and the other who views an image previously acquired on their PC (no 
evidence to raise a making charge). The current legal position in England and Wales defines 
that the second individual likely commits an offence because they possess the content subject 
to a legal test of possession (see R v Porter [2006]  [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 25), but permits a 
‘passive look’ by the first individual. This appears an arbitrary discrimination between these 
two acts, which at the core, still involve an individual seeking out IDCSA and driving demand 
for it.  
Intentionally accessing IDCSA within the confines of this article is a proposed offence derived 
from technological developments fundamentally changing the shape of an offence. 
Technology now offers access to IDCSA without needing to possess or create the content. 
The motives of an individual who accesses IDCSA may be similar to that of a potential 
possessor, to seek sexual stimulation from the imagery. Yet the law in England and Wales 
currently arguably arbitrarily distinguishes between an individual who captures the content of 
the image on their local device and another who does not. Despite this, both sets of individuals 
drive the demand for IDCSA, regardless of whether they seek to possess or just view it, the 
content in both cases has to be created, present and hosted online to see. Failing to regulate 
access to IDCSA indirectly suggests that only those who seek to possess (or create, distribute 
and publish) IDCSA are perceived as encouraging demand for it, which is arguably not 
accurate.  
Canadian legislation has already taken steps to distinguish the act of intentional accessing 
from that of mere possession. Section 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46) 
defines and accessing offence carrying a maximum 10 year sentence, with Section 163.1(4.2) 
stating that ‘a person accesses child pornography who knowingly causes child pornography 
to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or herself’’. The regulation of those who access 
IDCSA was introduced into Canadian law in 2002, following an acknowledgement of the im-
portance of Internet Service Provider information and its use in tracking offenders (Library of 
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Parliament, 2009; Smyth, 2007). Although Canadian statistics dissecting prosecutions by of-
fence type to assess the number of prosecutions obtained under the accessing offence could 
not be identified (see equivalent CPS (2015, p93) statistics), the accessing offence has re-
mained in force for over 15 years and forms part of a set of regulations put in place to stop 
any form of interaction with IDCSA and prevent child sexual abuse of this type (Bailey, 2007). 
Given that steps have already been taken to acknowledge the act of intentionally accessing 
IDCSA in foreign jurisdictions, it is argued that legislation in England and Wales should do the 
same.  
 
iv. A chance to respond to technology instead of react  
The proposal of an accessing offence provides an opportunity to respond to developments in 
technology (see Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 below for detailed examples of technological issues) 
in order to continue to regulate IDCSA. As societal perceptions of online confidentiality 
change, privacy enhancing technologies are now more prevalent. When coupled with potential 
access to IDCSA online, it is not beyond possibility to witness a shift in IDCSA where there is 
no longer a need to possess IDCSA and offenders can simply just view content online without 
leaving a trace on their local device. Such a movement would still see a demand for IDCSA, 
but one where those who are interacting with it are protected. Take for instance the situation 
where every person from this point on decides to access IDCSA online but never possesses 
or download a copy of an image to their local machine where they may become liable to 
prosecution, instead opting to revisit a particular site hosting IDCSA. In such a situation, it is 
unlikely that law enforcement would deem this a satisfactory state of affairs, given that IDCSA 
would still be in existence and in demand online. An implemented accessing offence presents 
an opportunity to proactively tackle the fight against IDCSA instead of waiting and reacting to 
potential shifts in offender behaviour. 
v. The child - is it right not to support the child by preventing access to the material? 
The question must be raised as to whether the appropriate authorities and organizations are 
under a moral obligation to support child victims of produced imagery by prohibiting access to 
it. It is argued that child victims are vulnerable to suffering psychological harm at the thought 
of the images documenting their abuse being subject to scrutiny online from others (Michaels, 
2008; Martin and Alaggia, 2013). With this acknowledgment, it may seem morally right to take 
steps to avert access to IDCSA in order to prevent further harm to child victims. An accessing 
offence may not only play a role of deterrent, but also provide some solace to child victims 
knowing that the level of regulation around IDCSA prohibits this act, potentially supporting any 
rehabilitation processes and stopping further harm. 
vi. Closing the loop 
Regulations surrounding IDCSA in England and Wales currently cover four core actions, but 
omit to address what this article is proposing as a need for a fifth and final stage to the set of 
regulations in this area. Prohibition of access is a move which provides an individual seeking 
IDCSA with no room to manoeuvre. By closing a perceived loophole, there is no method left 
to an individual in which to interact with IDCSA which would not result in a breach of law. With 
no scope to interact with IDCSA, there is potential to impact and lessen the production and 
volume of individuals interacting with it. 
To demonstrate the issues posed by technology driving the proposal offered in this article, in-
private browsing sessions, streaming facilities and encryption are analysed below and their 
impact on IDCSA investigations. 
3.2 Private-Browsing Sessions 
One of the key challenges posed by the Internet and its associated services is that users now 
have the ability to view IDCSA online whilst leaving minimal trace of this action behind on their 
device. It is typically these devices which are seized and subsequently examined during an 
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investigation, providing the primary source of evidence from which to base a prosecution 
attempt. However, techniques such as private browsing are designed to allow users to access 
content online without the need to download and store it. This is achieved by preventing 
cached website data and history records from being stored locally, leaving behind minimal 
traces of a user’s online actions. 
3.2.1 An Example: How Private Browsing Works in Practice 
The Internet browser market is dominated by both Google Chrome and Mozilla’s Firefox 
browsers (W3Schools, 2016), with both offering private browsing functionalities. Private 
browsing is a fairly recent addition to Internet browser applications, designed for users who 
seek to privatise their actions whilst browsing online and limit the amount of information 
regarding their browsing sessions being stored on their local device. Although different 
Internet browsers implement their private browsing functionality differently, the aim remains 
the same; to prevent information being retained regarding what they have done on-line. This 
often means that any subsequent forensic investigation of a private browsing session is likely 
to recover a lot less data than if a standard browsing session had been carried out (Magnet 
Forensics, 2016).  Records of search history, online website addresses and cached content 
are often not found on the system (some remnants may be discovered in unallocated areas 
of a system), with some data left behind in physical memory (a form of volatile memory used 
by all computers where content is purged every time the power is removed to the device – i.e. 
when it is shut down).  
The result of these sessions means that despite accessing a website hosting IDCSA online, 
finding data during a forensic investigation indicating this act may not be possible. As a result, 
we have a scenario where a defendant has accessed IDCSA and likely obtained sexual 
gratification from it, an act that is not prohibited within the confines of the current offences 
surrounding IDCSA.  
3.2.2 What is the Impact of Private Browsing? 
The impact of private browsing is that those who access IDCSA online via private browsing 
sessions are unlikely to have IDCSA automatically downloaded to their PC and stored in their 
cache (a process which occurs during normal browsing), which would leave an individual 
potentially liable for a possession or making offence (subject to evidence of intentional 
searching) under the range of offences stated in the PCA78 and CJA88. When using private 
browsing it is likely that no IDCSA which the user has accessed online will be present on the 
device. Further, there may even be no evidence of Internet history records showing where an 
individual was looking online despite having accessed this content. 
3.3 Media Streaming 
Streaming protocols provide the second area of concern. Transmission of media content 
across the Internet frequently takes place in one of two ways; direct download or via media 
streaming protocols, where the difference between methods has an impact on the current 
offence of possession and making/creating IDCSA. A direct download of a media file occurs 
when a request is sent to a host server, at which point the media in question is sent to the 
clients’ machine and stored on their local storage device, typically some form of hard drive 
(Sobh, 2008). In comparison, those who stream media via the Internet simply access the 
content on the host server, where they are able to view or listen to the content without having 
to wait for the content to download to their machine. In fact, streamed media may never be 
stored on the clients’ computer and it is this fact that currently makes it difficult to prosecute 
under the current range of IDCSA offences in England and Wales (Sobh, 2008) (owners of 
the stream will likely fall within the confines of existing creation, distribution / publishing 
offences). As with the issues noted above with private browsing, streaming protocols may 
leave little evidence of the streamed media behind on an individual’s device from which a 
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forensic investigation can interpret. This may be particularly troublesome if a user streams 
media from within a private browsing session.  
In the case of streaming a user is actually accessing the media content where in most cases, 
there is limited evidence of the streamed content in order to infer possession or making of 
IDCSA. At this point it is necessary to place a caveat on the statement above. Evidence left 
by streaming is often subject to the streaming protocol in use. Some streaming protocols buffer 
small quantities of data which are cached to the local machine, as seen with progressive 
downloading protocols (Begen et al., 2011). Such methods are designed to increase the users 
experience and performance of the stream, where fragments may be recoverable (for 
example, small Flash Video (.flv) files in the browser cache) with YouTube having adopted 
this protocol for its media streaming platform (Begen et al., 2011) (although adaptive 
streaming protocols are now favoured).   
By taking a look at the definitions of the acts involved in the offences surrounding IDCSA it is 
possible to see how streaming currently fails to fit. Possession denotes a state of having 
ownership or control, which a person streaming media has neither in regards to the streamed 
content. Further, as often no content relating to the stream may reside on the local machine, 
a suspect cannot be said to have made an additional form of IDCSA. Instead, accessing 
(defined as “the ability, right, or permission to approach, enter, speak with, or use; admittance” 
(Dictionary.com, 2016)) is the term which describes best the acts of interacting with a media 
stream. Here a user has the ability to use the stream, yet at no point do they possess the 
stream other than visually.   
3.4 Encryption  
Encryption techniques provide the final area of concern highlighted in this article. Encryption 
involves the obfuscation of information via a computational algorithm, often implemented for 
purposes of security and protection of information (Microsoft, 2014). Encryption can also be 
implemented for malevolent purposes, particularly to hide the remnants of a digital crime. 
Digital storage media holds data in a binary format, which is interpreted by computing software 
and transformed into a format, which is visually understandable. Encryption software can take 
this data and scramble the contents using mathematical algorithms rendering it unreadable 
(Chatterjee, 2011). Without an encryption key, (essentially a password used to reverse the 
algorithm returning the data back to its original state) content remains in an unreadable state 
(Sherwinter, 2006). Encryption provides the user with privacy and protection for their data, 
ensuring that should it get lost or stolen, it cannot be easily acquired or abused. There are 
strong arguments for the legitimate use of encryption and Microsoft; a leading organisation in 
computer software manufacturing now provides users with full disk encryption (encrypts the 
entire system hard drive) facilities since the production of their Windows Vista, 7 and 8 
operating systems (OS). However, conversely encryption provides a defendant with the ability 
to obfuscate illicit material and place it beyond the reach of authorities. For the digital forensic 
analyst, an opportunity to acquire or crack the password and decrypt the information may have 
significant time constraints. Sherwinter (2006) highlights that finding the correct encryption key 
to decrypt encrypted data can take upwards of 2 billion years utilising technology, which at the 
time of writing in 2007 was standard. Since then, despite computing power improving, 
encryption standards have increased leaving a similar problem. The problem encryption 
presents in relation to IDCSA remains that those who implement it effectively could prevent 
an effective investigation into IDCSA and ultimately preventing law enforcement officials from 
establishing whether an offence surrounding IDCSA has been committed.  
The UK Government introduced The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) in 
order to regulate surveillance techniques and the interception of communications (Akdeniz et 
10 
al., 2001). However this legislation provides a key tool for preventing offenders from escaping 
conviction through the use of encryption techniques (Chatterjee, 2011). Part III of RIPA is of 
particular interest given these developments in computing technology and determining 
whether a suspect is in possession of illicit material. A brief synopsis of Part III, specifically 
section 49 RIPA provides public authorities with the power to compel the disclosure of any 
encryption keys where it is believed the suspect is in possession of such a key. In simple 
terms, this part of RIPA addresses the issues of obligatory decryption of data (Palfreyman, 
2009). Section 49(2) RIPA allows a public authority to issue a notice of compliance to disclose 
the encryption key where there is reasonable grounds to believe that a key to the protected 
information is in the possession of any person. Section 53(5) RIPA states failure to comply 
can result in a two-year prison sentence or in cases of IDCSA, five years (as introduced by 
the Policing and Crime Act 2009). This section of RIPA raises a number of questions to 
address. The problem encryption raises is that subject to password disclosure or breaking the 
encryption, any evidence stored on an encrypted device cannot be accessed. Encryption is 
designed to obfuscate data, leaving no indication of what is contained upon the device, making 
prosecution for possession and making/creating IDCSA practically impossible.  
The three technologies discussed above bear one thing in common, they all potentially prevent 
any IDCSA which an individual has accessed and viewed from being discovered during an 
investigation. Yet, evidence of what IDCSA an individual has accessed using these provision 
may still be available from Internet Service Providers. This has led to the proposal for 
implementing an offence of accessing to combat these issues.  
 
4 A Call for a New Offence: 'Intentional Accessing' 
This article calls for the development of a fifth offence, one of 'intentional accessing IDCSA' to 
add to those existing under the PCA78 and CJA88. An intentional accessing offence is offered 
as a method for combatting troublesome technologies such as those discussed above. 
Although there are conflicting reports as to whether viewing encourages contact offender or 
prevents it (Houtepen, 2014; Long, et al 2012), it is argued that there is an implicit link and 
preventing access to IDCSA closes what can be perceived as an existing gap in legislation. 
Further, an intentional accessing offence will allow for the prosecution of those engaging with 
IDCSA, but that fall outside of current regulations. The problem here is that IDCSA are 
primarily produced to offer some form of sexual satisfaction to the viewer. This is arguably 
obtained when the images are accessed and viewed, where there is no longer a requirement 
to save and store these images for later use (which would subsequently make the offender 
vulnerable to prosecution for making or possession of IDCSA) if the user chooses not to do 
so. It can also be seen as a method for stemming the production of new material and a 
deterrent for those currently involved or considering it.    
The act of viewing is defined as 'the action of inspecting or looking at something' (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016). When looking at IDCSA, analogy is drawn to the act of window shopping, 
where a person can look at content but never engage in a transaction where they are deemed 
to have taken possession of any items. In addition, a similar shift in culture is witnessed with 
legitimate pornography, where access to this material via streaming, as opposed to 
purchasing copies of the material, is now a common process. In context, it remains currently 
viable for individuals to source IDCSA hosted online, view it, and providing none of that content 
is downloaded to their local device (cached by their Internet browser) or that it is encrypted 
and beyond current powers of recovery, operate outside of current offences defined in 
England and Wales under the CPA78 and CJA88. Although just viewing IDCSA online may 
seem like a victimless crime, this is inaccurate, with Michaels (2008) stating that harm is 
caused to the original child victim depicted in the image because of the knowledge that the 
image is in circulation with the potential to be viewed, providing a strong motive for 
implementing an accessing offence. Similarly, by failing to prohibit acts of viewing, there is no 
deterrent for the act, potentially indirectly driving the production of new material to be hosted 
online. In addition, it may encourage a shift in culture surrounding IDCSA, where a movement 
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towards the development of ‘view only’ (content which can be accessed and seen, but not 
downloaded or acquired) images may be seen as a means to evade current legal regulation. 
Therefore those who are only accessing IDCSA to view it should be regulated. 
Seigfried-Spellar (2014) indicates 'viewers are individuals who did not intentionally or 
knowingly download any pornographic images of minors; instead, these individuals admitted 
to searching for and accessing websites in order to view online child pornography'. Although 
these individuals view the material online, this paper champions the terminology of ‘accessing’ 
when defining the offence, for the following reasons. First, access can easily be established 
objectively via Internet connection records (now facilitated by the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016 – see discussion in Section 4.1). Second, in technical terms a user accesses material 
which ultimately leading to the user viewing the material presented to them on screen. 
Therefore the term access is preferable to that of viewing to prevent debate arising around 
whether a suspect has actually visually seen an image on screen. 
 
4.1 How to Implement an Accessing Offence: - The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
In November 2015, the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (DIPB) was presented to the UK 
Parliament, designed to replace the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. The 
UK Parliament stated that the DIPB “would provide a framework for the use of investigatory 
powers by law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies, as well as other public 
authorities. The draft Bill included provisions for the interception of communications, the 
retention and acquisition of communications data, the use of equipment interference, and the 
acquisition of bulk data for analysis” (Parliament.uk, 2015). The focus of the DIPB was the 
regulation of communication untaken by criminals and terrorists by allowing their online 
actions to be examined and the implementation of powers to intercept, collect and analyse 
communication traffic. The DIPB was subject to public, academic and industry pre-legislative 
scrutiny (DIPB, 2015, pp.1) and attracted significant media attention, and criticism, having 
been attributed the name ‘Snoopers’ Charter’ due to its implementation of powers of 
surveillance (BBC News, 2016). Despite concerns, on November 29th 2016, the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016 (IPA16) received royal assent, bringing into force the Investigatory Powers 
Act 2016.  
Of particular interest to the facilitation of the offence of intentional accessing proposed in this 
paper is the communication data collection and retention requirements. To provide insight on 
what communication data consists of, the DIPB (pp.12) stated that “communications data is 
information about communications: the ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘with whom’ of a 
communication but not what was written or said”. One of the focuses of the IPA16 are ICRs. 
IRCs are records of what user’s access online (records of website visits etc.) and are gathered 
by ISPs (referred to as Telecommunications Operators in the IPA16, see Section 261(10)) 
and under the IPA16, IRCs must be maintained by ISPs for up to 12 months. The IPA16 places 
the same obligations on all companies providing services to the UK or in control of 
communications systems in the UK (DIPB, pp.30). Essentially, this regulation offers law 
enforcement the ability to evaluate a suspect’s conduct online across this period of time and 
retrospectively analyse their actions. 
The powers for data retention in the IPA16 have been met with controversy with suggestions 
that its measures are invasive, encroaching on an individual’s right to privacy and allowing law 
enforcement to 'snoop' (BBC News, 2015). Yet a public consensus poll undertaken in 2014 by 
research agency TNS  showed 71% of the 1195 people questioned 'think the government 
should prioritise reducing the threat posed by terrorists and serious criminals even if this 
erodes peoples’ right to privacy' (TNS, 2014). A critical assessment of the IPA16’s content 
and application is beyond the scope of this article, where focus must be drawn to how this 
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legislation can support the implementation of an intentional accessing offence for the 
regulation of IDCSA. 
4.2 How can the IPA16 Support the Regulation of those Intentionally Accessing IDCSA? 
The value of using online communication data for detecting and prosecuting those involved in 
IDCSA cannot be underestimated, where in some circumstances it may be the only way to 
identify an offender (DIPB, pp.12). The DIPB provided the following insight into the importance 
of intercepted communication data for the purpose of supporting law enforcement to identify 
and prosecute those involved in child abuse offences.  
From a sample of 6025 referrals to the Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
Command (CEOP) of the NCA, 862 (14%) cannot be progressed and would 
require the provisions in the Investigatory Powers Bill to have any prospect of 
doing so. That is a minimum of 862 suspected paedophiles, involved in the 
distribution of indecent imagery of children, who cannot be identified without this 
legislation. This also means that in some cases law enforcement do not have 
access to essential data regarding an investigation as it has not been retained – 
this includes, for example, the identity of an individual suspected of sharing 
indecent images of children or the people with whom a missing person was last 
in contact (DIPB, pp.25). 
The interception and retention of communication data also played a vital role in the case of 
Iain Watkins, lead singer of the Lost-prophets band, supporting the identification of those 
involved (DIPB, pp.14). The 12 month retention of data period defined in the IPA16 is seen as 
a proportionate response, where countries such as Australia having opted for a retention 
period of up to two years. Further, Paul Lincoln, director for the Office for Security and Counter 
Terrorism indicated that nearly half of requests made in child sexual exploitation cases as of 
2012 were for data between 10 and 12 months old and was identified as a common starting 
point for investigations (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015a). The 
debate on the length of the data retention period has raised concerns particularly in relation 
to data privacy and the additional costs incurred by ISPs to store this data securely for this 
period of time. However the need is clear as demonstrated by a survey carried out across 64 
law enforcement organisations by Michael Atkinson, Secretary to the National Police Council’s 
Data Communications Group who states the following. 
To give you an example, we covered nearly 10,000 pieces of data and 
applications. That is what this survey was about. Nine per cent of those 
applications were for sexual offences. What was interesting was that 37% of 
that 9% of data that we applied for was more than six months old. We would 
say, and you can see, that retaining the data for more than six months is very 
important … 
…What is really interesting is a document produced by the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner's Office on 20 November 2015, only last 
month, which is a breakdown of communications data and applications. It shows 
over 100,000 communications data applications, 19% of which were in relation 
to sexual offences. Two things jumped straight out at me. First, this is a 100% 
increase from the survey that we did in 2012. Secondly, 37% of roughly 19,000 
is over 7,000. We would say that, if we retain data for only six months, hundreds 
if not thousands of suspects for sexual offences would likely evade prosecution 
(Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). 
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Further, Detective Superintendent Matt Long of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection 
Command at the National Crime Agency stated that of the potential 1,500 referrals received 
by the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children in the US, the first step in the majority 
of cases was to analyse communication data (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory 
Powers Bill, 2015c). Further, during Operation Notarise, 745 offenders were arrested 
nationally, where requests for communication data were made with all, resulting in the 
safeguarding of 518 children (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). 
It is worth noting that if retention periods dropped to six months, 60% of these offenders would 
be lost (Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). Alan Wardle, Head of 
Policy and Public Affairs, NSPCC, indicated that within the UK, organisations working the with 
Internet Watch Foundation are very proactive, often removing hosted IDCSA online within two 
hours. However, the problem remains where foreign territories are hosting IDCSA and live 
streaming acts of child abuse, reported to be crowdfunded (Joint Committee on the Draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015b). The use of retained Internet records is seen as crucial to 
policing IDCSA online by facilitating the identification of those who interact with this material 
(Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, 2015c). Retention periods of 12 
months provide a window of opportunity potentially long enough to process investigations in 
IDCSA and utilize collected ICRs to facilitate an intentional accessing offence and track down 
potential offenders (Powell et al, 2015). 
4.3 IPA16, ICRs and an ‘Intentional Accessing' Offence 
Consider the situation where a suspect has been accessing IDCSA online but effectively 
deletes any trace of this activity from their local machine, beyond forensic recovery. Where a 
traditional forensic analysis of a suspect’s device may not reveal the true extent of their 
actions, ISP maintained ICRs are the only option for establishing this content. By retaining 
ICRs the necessary data may be available for tying suspect Internet traffic to an offender and 
what they have accessed online (Home Office, 2014). ICR information can also be used to 
establish intentional browsing behaviour, showing connections to a website initiated by a 
user’s device, including visits to IDCSA hosting websites, supporting the identification of those 
intentionally accessing this content.  
Despite private browsing functionalities protecting data from being stored on the defendant’s 
computer, evidence of their visit to an illegal website (ICRs) is maintained by their ISP (as 
confirmed by Google (2016) Chromes usage policy), who are now required by the IPA16 to 
maintain this content. Essentially, private-browsing functionalities implement what can be 
termed as a ‘locally private’ service, where information regarding their online actions is not 
private from their service provider (BT, SKY etc.). Similarly, those who stream IDCSA content 
either via normal browsing protocols or private browsing are not anonymous and can be 
tracked (subject to the use of anonymisation protocols such as Tor). Essentially an intentional 
accessing offence would provide a two-pronged attack on IDCSA streams, where streamers 
of IDCSA fall under existing legislative coverage (creation / distribution) and the individuals 
streaming the content are prohibited from accessing the content and driving demand for it. 
Finally, where encryption is discovered on a device and the content cannot be decrypted, ICRs 
could potentially indicate the types of content being accessed via the device and potentially 
stored. In all cases, an intentional accessing offence is a method of prosecuting those who 
are viewing IDCSA online but taking measures to ensure this content does not become 
'findable' during an standard forensic investigation should they be arrested. 
Implementing an intentional accessing offence can be seen as a method for expanding current 
legislative powers in terms of apprehending those engaging with IDCSA. It also provides an 
offence which can be enforced without reliance being placed upon data resident on a suspect’s 
local device, which is subject to being tampered with and destroyed.  
4.3.1 Distinguishing the innocent 
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The implementation of an accessing offence would increase the range of acts which may incur 
liability, raising concerns regarding erroneous prosecutions. The act of accessing can in theory 
be committed in the fraction of a second, where intentional and accidental ‘accesses’ to IDCSA 
websites must be considered and distinguished with accuracy. As a result, to achieve this 
distinction, an accessing offence needs to examine a defendants actions as a whole, 
considering their course of conduct and therefore consideration of ICRs prior to, and, after an 
access to a website containing IDCSA need to be examined. This may show an individual who 
accesses IDCSA as part of a series of browsed websites of this type, or an individual who 
merely accidentally lands on a website, out of synch with browsing habits and then continues 
normal browsing. Where one may demonstrate a number of ICRs to numerous IDCSA hosting 
sites and links within such domains, an innocent browser may only exhibit a single ICR 
amongst legal websites. By analysing a browsing session as a whole, the volume of accesses 
to IDCSA hosting websites and the pattern of access can all be taken into account when 
considering culpability, as well as a counter argument to such acts where this information can 
be factored into the development of a defence to accessing.  
4.4 Counter Arguments Regarding the Implementation of an Intentional Accessing 
Offence 
Justifications for implementing an offence of intentionally accessing IDCSA have been 
provided in Section 3.1.1; however the practical feasibilities also need to be considered. The 
imposition of a fifth offence involving IDCSA would add additional burden to an already limited 
set of resources available to law enforcement. At present, IDCSA provides regulatory issues 
where the UK government has already acknowledged an inability to process and investigate 
the number of individuals already believed to be involved (HC Deb 4 July 2013). Therefore, 
any decision to implement an offence of this type needs to be considered not only against any 
justifiable need to regulate accessing, but also against whether such an offence could be 
effectively enforced. In turn, given limitations in available resources, it could be argued that 
investment should be directed at targeting acts of physical child abuse as opposed to digital 
offences.   
In addition, an intentional accessing offence would be reliant on the imposition of data 
retention periods under the IPA2016. Now in force, ISP data must be maintained. Acquiring 
access to this information for the purposes of identifying those accessing known IDCSA 
websites may prove troublesome as any analysis must be done securely, whilst ensuring the 
privacy innocent Internet users is not compromised. Processing the data would place an 
additional encumbrance on ISP resources, which are already likely feeling the strain of the 
additional requirements of having to retain the significant volumes of user ICRs for the 12 
month retention period. As a result, securing access and then compliance to evaluate data in 
such a way may prove troublesome and in turn, may heighten public contention for the IPA16 
and the perceived intrusive surveillance of online behaviour. Enforcement of an accessing 
offence also relies on the accuracy of ICRs meaning that those who take steps to mask or 
utilize ananoymisation services such as Tor are unlikely to be traceable. In such cases, an 
intentional accessing offence may be unenforceable as individuals cannot be identified. 
However, this limitation currently applies with the enforcement of existing offences 
surrounding IDCSA, where reliance is placed on the accuracy of any information packages 
supplied to law enforcement by ISPs with relation to the tracking of potential distributors of 
IDCSA online. Accuracy issues would also exist in relation to correctly identifying those who 
access IDCSA from the masses of normal Internet user data collected by ISPs under the 
IPA16, where financial and/or criminal liability for misidentification would likely be accrued. 
This additional responsibility of processing IRCs would unlikely be assumed by ISPs and 
therefore would likely provide an additional resourcing issue for law enforcement. 
A final area of consideration lies with the question, should intentionally accessing IDCSA be 
an offence? Arguments for this offence have been offered in Section 3.1.1 but counter 
arguments should be given. In addition, regulatory and resource issues have already been 
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addressed, leaving only contemplation of the fundamental act of accessing. As highlighted by 
Pritchard et al., (2016) there is a lack of research which can quantify societal perceptions of 
those who interact with IDCSA and how this act is perceived. Yet, substantial media coverage 
and reported acts of public outrage suggest that IDCSA is generally considered abhorrent 
(Horsman, 2016). Pritchard et al’s., (2016) study demonstrated that a majority of surveyed 
participants perceived the act of viewing IDCSA online as a wrongful act, despite being 
confined to a university student demographic. As of yet, there has been no large scale 
evaluation of public perceptions of the act of accessing IDCSA online and this remains an 
area arguably in need of evaluation.  
5 Concluding Thoughts 
This article calls for the implementation of an offence of intentionally accessing IDCSA as a 
response to technological developments and the Internet, which currently allow individuals to 
access and view IDCSA in a way that may prohibit attempts to prosecute individuals engaging 
in this behaviour under the current range of offences. Functionalities such as private browsing 
and streaming now mean that there is limited evidential data left behind by those utilising these 
options to accessing IDCSA online. Where a suspect uses a device to access IDCSA in a way 
which prevents the image being stored on a suspect’s local device, there is no offence of 
possession or creation. The suspect actions are defined as having ‘accessed’ IDCSA, which 
remains an unregulated act. This article offers two contributions, first, arguments for the need 
to implement an offence of ‘intentional accessing’, and second, a discussion of the feasibility 
of implementing an offence of this type and how it can be supported by the recent enactment 
of the IPA2016.  
Such a move can be seen as a 'widening of the net', increasing the scope for prosecuting 
those involved with IDCSA whilst providing a deterrent for those involved in this form of 
material in an attempt to stem the flow of existing content and the production of new imagery. 
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